The Americans

In addition to the estimated 2,000 enlisted men at Coolidge and another 300 or so at Crabbs, there were American foremen and skilled workers brought by the two civilian contractors, officers, and a constant stream of visitors off ships and airplanes. This was an enormous influx in an island with a population of roughly 25,000. Virtually all were male and white, and many of the enlisted men came from the U.S. South — a decision having been made not to send black American troops to Antigua (FO 371/A3511/18/45, File 34106), presumably because of the secret nature of the anti-submarine activity in Antigua, since black American troops were sent to Trinidad.

There was a great deal of correspondence between the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, and the Americans about this issue: the British were concerned about reports of racial animosity in Trinidad and were under pressure at home not to appear discriminatory. Thus in 1941, the British assured the American government that they had not requested that no black Americans be included among the civilian employees sent to build the bases in the Caribbean. In 1942, the question was again raised in the House of Commons and again the Americans were assured that the allegations were unfounded (CO 971/20/72059/1941; FO 371/A1065/10/45, 1942, File 30638). Nevertheless, the British were concerned that black Americans would be working beside West Indians while earning many times more, leading to local unrest, and so insisted that they preferred the use of local labor (see, e.g., FO 371/A1798/10/45, File 30640; also see Palmer 1983 for a discussion of Trinidad; and Krigger 1986 for an illuminating discussion of similar reactions to the Americans in St. Thomas when the United States took over in 1917).[2]

High Point pier as it looked in 2005.

This issue arose again in 1943, when the United States decided to send Puerto Rican troops to replace "continental" U.S. troops in the British West Indian islands. This time the issue of color was compounded by the issue of nation: when polled, the local governors from Jamaica, the Leewards, British Guiana, and Trinidad all objected, reporting that they were concerned about the "serious political difficulties" that could result if "other West Indians" were brought to defend their islands when local troops were not considered trustworthy enough to do so. It was not just that Puerto Ricans were "other" West Indians, however, but that Puerto Rican troops, who were of a "Spanish-negro strain," would as U.S. nationals "expect to be treated as white men, a thing that would in practice almost certainly involve serious trouble amounting possibly to disorder." Governor Jardine wrote from Antigua that he was worried about contact between Puerto Ricans, who were well on the way to self-government, and "leftist coloured Antiguans." (In Trinidad, where there had been serious clashes between the American black troops and the local population, the governor was pushing hard to get the black Americans removed, and although he was concerned that he might end up with both black Americans and Puerto Ricans, he agreed that Puerto Ricans would be preferable. He warned, however, that although the Puerto Ricans might "feel themselves to be white, they are not likely to be so regarded here," and this would undoubtedly lead to problems.) The Chief of Staff, Porto [sic] Rico Dept. of U.S. Army, cannot have helped matters much when he wrote the U.S. army commander in Antigua (who passed the letter along to the governor, who in turn passed it to the Foreign Office) that "We draft Porto Rican troops into white and coloured units... Porto Rican officers are white and of social class equal to continental officers."

The United States then told Britain that it needed to find a place for 15,000 Puerto Rican troops and wanted them in inactive theaters involving minimal shipping — not a sign of great trust. It refused to bow to any British concerns: that Puerto Ricans replace black troops in Trinidad, that this be for the duration of the war only, and that the numbers be limited. It was, however, willing to select only "white Puerto Ricans with knowledge of English and high school standard" for the West Indies. The Foreign Office had no choice but to agree, and Puerto Rican troops began to arrive in September 1943. (On all this, see FO 371/File 34106: A3511/18/45; A4276/18/45; A4277/18/45; FO 371/File 34111: A8080/18/45; A8250/18/45; with enclosures. Much of this correspondence was marked "Secret" and "Most Secret" and one letter noted that the matter was "explosive" and "too dangerous to be handled on paper" — presumably because it concerned issues of race, which was tied in the Foreign Office mind to wartime security.)

To Antiguans, the Puerto Ricans were a real puzzle. They considered themselves white — one even refused to work with a black man at the base — and they were treated as white by the Americans. But as Sir Bede Clifford, Governor of Trinidad, had foretold, the Antiguans did not accept the ascription so easily: Puerto Ricans may have ridden on the whites-only buses, but to Antiguans they neither looked nor behaved like whites. An article in the Magnet referred sarcastically to the passengers as "white and so-called white" employees (Magnet, 20 December 1943). (In one of history's nice ironies, the black unit that had been in Trinidad went on to become part of the Puerto Rican unit, the 84th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion (see Palmer 1983: 61).)